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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN Case No. 
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND 18191 
TOWN. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant herewith files its Reply Brief pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 75 (p) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents at page 2 of their brief, characterize that 
portion of Highland City containing respondents' "rectangle" 
as "a peninsula extending east of the main portion of the 
city." This is a conclusion not warranted by the facts. 
Highland has no commercial district or any other location 
commonly known as "the main portion" of the city. The area 
sought to be disconnected is as vital to the interests of 
Highland as any other. Indeed, because of its recreational 
potential, Respondents' property could well be referred to 
as the "main portion of the city." Respondents' character-
ization, therefore, tends to minimize the importance of the 
territory under consideration. 
- 1 -
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Respondents, at page 4 of their brief, say "there is 
no evidence that the zoning of the property in question 
would be changed if returned to the jurisdiction of Utah 
County. 11 On the other hand, though, there is abundant 
evidence that Respondents have always intended to use the 
territory for the purpose of extracting gravel (T. 130, 
249). Respondents have never at any time denied this in-
tention. Indeed, they went so far in October, 1978, as to 
file a separate lawsuit against both Highland City and Utah 
County for the purpose of having Highland City's zoning of 
the territory in question and Utah County's zoning of ad-
jacent property declared invalid, as violative of both State 
and Federal Constitutions. That case is entitled Gibbons 
Realty Company, a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Highland 
Town, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, and 
Utah County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, 
Defendants; and was filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County under Civil No. 50233. 
These steps taken by Respondents certainly would not 
indicate an unliklihood that the zoning will be changed. 
Respondents at page 6 of their brief say, in what purports 
to be a statement of fact, but what instead amounts to a 
legal conclusion, that 11 •••• the maps introduced in evidence 
show that there would be no islands or peninsular masses 
- 2 -
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created by the disconnection of the property in question." 
Appellant submits that the contrary is true, and that the 
map submitted by stipulation with Appellant's brief clearly 
shows the creation of an island consisting of the so-called 
"Kjar Property. 11 
Finally, Respondents at page 6 of their brief state as a 
fact that "the property is not needed for the future growth 
of Highland City." This is clearly erroneous. Testimony is 
abundant that the territory is very much needed, for one reason 
or another, to foster and accommodate the futµre growth of 
Highland City. This is particularly clear in the testimony 
of Mayor Donald R. LeBaron (T. 76, 77, 78, 182, 183, 228). 
REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
In a somewhat cavalier manner Respondents attempt to 
dismiss out of hand the very considerable s!gnificance of 
the language in Sections 10-2-501 (3) and 10-2-503, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended, authorizing any interested 
persons to testify against the granting of a disconnection 
petition, and providing for consideration by the Court of 
the "other factors" set forth in their testimony .. 
Respondents characterize these important substantive 
provisions as "isolated wording," as though to suggest that 
the Legislature simply didn't know what it was doing when it 
wrote the language. 
- 3 -
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Indeed, disconnection hearings cannot be limited forever 
to the consideration of just the stereotypical, stringently 
limi~ed areas relied on in an earlier era. If the Legislature 
deems it worthwhile that the Courts consider new and different 
"other factors", so be it. 
In Heathman vs. Giles 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839, (1962), 
quoted at p~ge 9 of their brief, Respondents themselves, quote 
language tending to limit the rule of "nosci tur a sociis" 
to "doubtful words or phrases." Appellant submits that the 
rule does not apply here for the reason that "among other 
factors" is not a doubtful phrase at all. 
As stated in Appellant's Brief at page 14, the controlling 
word, "other 11 , does not. have a doubtful meaning. It always 
means "different. 11 It never means "similar to" or the "same". 
Appellant•s quotation from 67 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 
908 makes that abundantly clear. If "other factors", means 
"different factors", then Respondents' attempt to use 
"noscitur a sociis" is irrelevant and in no way helpful to 
Respondents' position. 
For the same reason the rule of "ejusdem generis" referred 
to in Respondents' brief at page 10 does not apply either. 
Even if "ejusdem generis 11 were otherwise appropriate .. 
it would not be of any help to Respondents here because it 
applies only where general words follow, rather than precede, 
- 4 -
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the specific ones. Appellant pointed this out in its brief 
at page 15 in quoting from Lyman vs. Bowmar, Colo. 533 P2d 
1129 (1975). 
In an effort to get around the logic of that holding 
Respondents cite Application of Central Airlines, Okla., 
185 P2d 919 (1947). There the Court was concerned with the 
words "shall include", a phrase that is far more restrictive 
than "among other factors", the distinction of course, being 
the use of the word "other". "Shall include" can mean 
11 similar" or the 11 same 11 , but "other" cannot. Indeed, "other" 
has to mean "different from". Therefore, the cited case is 
of no help whatsoever to Respondents' position. 
At page 12 of their brief Respondents arrive at the 
illogical conclusion that it is fine for the Court to hear 
all the evidence that any interested party desires to talk 
about, but wrong for the Court to pay much attention to it. 
They talk about "mistaken ideas" and "unsubstantiated fears." 
On the contrary, the Court should have declared all of the 
evidence presented to be relevant, then decided whether to 
allow disconnection on the basis of its weight and quality. 
Appellant's evidence referred to in paragraphs 1 through 
11 on pages 13 through 16 of Respondents' brief is all rele-
vant to the ultimate question, and the Court not only should 
have heard it, but also carefully weighed it along with the 
- 5 -
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other matters that it did deem to be relevant. 
Some particular objections of Respondents are wholly 
without merit and require comment. In paragraph 2 they refer 
to some supposedly improper action-- 11 manipulation", to use 
their word--on the part of Appellant in entering into a long 
term lease, with option to buy, of some property owned by 
Respondent Utah Power and Light Co. As Respondents well 
know, this property is intended to serve as a City Park 
(T. 182) and it was right and proper that Appellant should 
seek to tie it up. Appellant certainly cannot be criticized 
for that action, or for the fact that it would, in fact, 
create an island and constitute another valid reason why the 
territory should not be disconnected. 
In paragraph 5, Respondents make quite a point of the idea 
that Respondent J. Keith Hayes' overture toward being released 
from the lawsuit was due to some pressure brought by the City. 
No impropriety was alleged at the trial, and it doesn•t 
really matter why Hayes wanted to pull out. This merely 
adds to the weight of the evidence that the Court should have 
considered. 
In paragraph 7, Respondents attempt to obscure the obvious 
fact that if Gibbons and Reed has its way a tremendous in-
crease in the volume of truck traffic will appear on the 
streets of Highland City with all its attendent evils. 
- 6 -
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Authority for this fact is Emery Carter, Executive Vice 
President of Gibbons and Reed who said "you would probably 
have about one truck every twelve minutes if you are work-
ing about 40 weeks a year, eight hours a day, five days a 
week." (T. 249). So Mrs. Mathis' concerns were certainly 
justified. 
The Court should have followed the intent of the two 
controlling statutes. Not only should it have heard all 
the testimony offered by Appellant's witnesses, but should 
have deemed it all relevant and then proceeded to give it 
the same consideration and to weigh it as carefully as it 
did the evidence adduced by Respondents. 
It was pointless and wasteful of the time of the Court, 
counsel, and witnesses to hear the evidence but refuse to 
pay any attention to it. This certainly wasn't contemplated 
by the statutes. 
REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Although they cite several Utah cases, Respondents are 
unable to come up with any definition of the words "justice 
and equity." All that they are able to do is give illustra-
tions of some findings made in those cases in which disconnect-
ion was allowed. In fact, Respondents are quite candid in 
admitting that Utah statutes do not define the phrase at 
all. 
- 7 -
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There is nothing in the quotations from the cases that 
would indicate that counsel for the cities involved in them 
-even made an effort, as Appellant did, to present any evidence 
of ''such other factors." Indeed, it may very well be that 
this is the first Utah disconnection case in which this sort 
of evidence has been relied on to any extent whatsoever. 
If that is so, the Court has not had an adequate opportunity 
in the reported cases to welgh such new and different evidence 
against the old categories in attempting to decide whether 
the standard of "justice and equity" has been met. 
For example, the evidence presented by Dr. LaMond Tullis 
about the surveys taken among Highland's residents showing a 
strong aversion to the type of gravel extraction envisioned 
by Gibbons and Reed (T. 149) makes it difficult to conclude 
that a mere handful of landowners are entitled, as a matter 
of "justice and equity" to disconnection from Highland City 
over the strenuous disapproval of the vast majority of High-
land's residents. 
Respondents sidestepped Appellants issue as to the meaning 
of the word "require" in the context of the phrase 11 justice 
and equity require." The cases cited by Appellant at page 
17 of its brief, to which Respondents made no response at 
all, clearly show that the word "require 1' does not merely 
mean "allow" or "permit.' 1 "Require" means "irnperitive need", 
- 8 -
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"compel", or "mandatory", and none of these conditions have 
been shown to exist in this case. 
The issue of whether the Court was obligated to give the 
same consideration to Appellant's evidence as it did to 
Respondents' (Point I) is intertwined with the issue of whether 
"justice and equity" "require" the disconnection (Point II). 
If this Court finds that the trial Court erred in not deeming 
Appellant's evidence to be 11 relevant", it must certainly 
conclude that Appellant's evidence is strong enough to sustain 
a finding that "justice and equity require" a finding against 
disconnection, rather than for it. 
REPLY TO POINT III OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
The map filed by stipulation along with Appellant's brief 
clearly shows the fact that the "Kjar property" is nothing 
but an island--out there entirely by itself--with no connection 
whatsoever with the rest of the City of Highland--unless, of 
course, the Order of Disconnection should be reversed. 
Respondents would leave the City in a shambles--consisting, 
geographically, of two entirely separate territories trying 
to function as a single city--an-almost impossible task. 
Evidence of this fact, unfortunately, could not have been 
introduced at the trial--simply because it didn't exist at 
the time. 
- 9 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, the information was conveyed to the Court and 
counsel soon after the annexation came into being. Appellant's 
attorney wrote a letter to the Court on September 16, 1981, 
(R. 144) fully setting forth_ the facts. At that time, no 
Findings or Conclusions had been prepared, and no Order of 
Disconnection had been signed. So the Court had considerable 
time in which to consider the new facts. It would have been 
a simple thing to schedule a further hearing, or in lieu 
thereof, to modify the Findings and Conclusions and to 
reverse the Order. 
Substantial justice could have been provided in this manner, 
but it was not. What we have, instead, is a situation that 
flies directly in the face of the statute (10-2-503), the 
intent of which is to prohibit disconnection of territory 
where it results in the creation of such islands as the Kjar 
property. 
Respondents make much of the point raised in Campbell vs. 
American Foreign SS Corp., 116 F 2d 926 (2d cir. 1941), quoted 
in Respondents' brief at page 25, about newly discovered 
evidence having to be in existence at the time of the trial. 
That case would not seem to apply here because, as previously 
pointed out, this case had not come to an end. Indeed, no 
decision had been made, there was no jury involved, and only 
the slightest inconvenience would have occurred in scheduling 
another few minutes of testimony and argument. It was such a 
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little thing to do in order to prevent such an unfortunate 
result. 
The other case particularly relied on by Respondents, 
Patrick vs. Sedwick,Alaska 413 P2d 169 (1976) is not really 
in point. In fact, all the general grounds for the granting 
of a new trial set forth in that case, and paraphrased on 
page 25 of Respondents' brief are met here. 
There is no merit, either, in Respondents' argument that 
Appellant "managed" the evidence in the case, and presumably 
therefore, should be denied the relief it seeks. The leasing 
of the Utah Power and Light property, and the annexation of 
the Kjar property were proper in every respect and certainly 
in the public interest. 
The Court had an obligation to take the simple and timely 
actions necessary to guarantee a proper resolution of this 
case. All it had to do was take a little more evidence and 
hear a little, more argument. This it failed and refused to 
do, and# thus, deprived Appellant of substantive rights to 
which it was entitled. This amounted to an abuse of the 
Court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents' able counsel has argued his points well, 
but has been unable to show that Appellant was not entitled 
to have the testimony of its witnesses heard and considered. 
- 11 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the trial Court in the same manner as Respondents' own 
witnesses; that "justice and equity require" the disconnection 
of the territory; or that the denial of Appellant's motion 
for a new trial or to amend Findings, Conclusions, and Order 
should have been denied by the Court. 
Instead, the Order of the Court should be reversed and 
the case remanded for the reasons set forth here and in 
Appellant's original brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Highland Town, aka 
Highland City, a Municipal 
Corporation 
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